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FOREWORD
The future of Iraq is uncertain. The country is in a dangerous phase.
The removal of a brutal dictatorship by coalition forces in April 2003
has given the Iraqi people hope for a new and better political system,
where individuals do not have to live in continuing fear and uncertainty.
Nevertheless, the Iraqi people must also address the difﬁcult challenges of
self-government for a diverse population, with major ethnic and sectarian
groups that often maintain widely divergent agendas. If they fail to do
this and an ethnic/sectarian war ensues, the consequences will be dire, not
only for Iraq, but for the entire Middle Eastern region.
This monograph, by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, does not predict an Iraqi
civil war, which is the worst-case outcome for the current struggle in
Iraq. Neither can this monograph fully rule out this possibility since the
responsibility for preventing such an eventuality is ultimately Iraqi and not
American, and U.S. analysts cannot predict with certainty what Iraqis will
do once they take full control of their own country. Rather, this monograph
underscores what is at stake in the Middle East by a comprehensive
discussion of potential region-wide consequences should an ethnic and
sectarian war actually occur. This work therefore serves as an important
warning of how an Iraq civil war could offer new strategic opportunities,
but especially dangers, to many of the states within the Middle East. Dr.
Terrill’s work performs this important task by examining how an Iraqi civil
war may develop and how this could inﬂuence the internal stability and
foreign policies of regional countries.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a
contribution to the national security debate on this important subject as
our nation grapples with a variety of problems associated with the U.S.
presence in Iraq and the new strategic reality following Saddam’s removal
from power. This analysis should be especially useful to U.S. military
strategic leaders as they seek to understand the complicated interplay
between Iraq and its neighbors at this critical point. It reﬂects analysis
conducted with an information cutoff date of December 2004.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Contemporary Iraqi society is comprised of Shi’ite Arabs, Sunni
Arabs, ethnic Kurds, and a variety of smaller ethnic or religious
minorities. In the post-Saddam era, differences among these groups
will either emerge as a barrier to political cooperation and national
unity, or they will instead be mitigated as part of the struggle to deﬁne
a new and more inclusive system of government. Should Iraqi ethnic
and sectarian differences become unmanageable, a violent struggle
for political power may ensue. Democracy, if it can be established,
can regulate and then alleviate the hostility leading to such events,
but this function usually occurs only after the development of strong,
largely unbiased political institutions and political parties, which
transcend ethnic and religious differences. Ethnic and sectarian-based
political parties, even if internally democratic, often feel pressure to
tolerate or even embrace extremism in order to retain their base of
power and undercut rivals who might claim more expansive rights
for the community. Except for the fear of intercommunal conﬂicts,
such political parties often have few political reasons to consider the
rights of rival communities since they are outside of their base of
power.
This monograph does not predict an ethnic or sectarian civil
war in Iraq, nor does it assume that a civil war will necessarily be
based on ethnic and sectarian differences if it occurs. Rather, the
author assumes that the post-Saddam political situation in Iraq
can have a variety of possible outcomes, only the worst of which is
intercommunal warfare, either in the near or medium term future.
This work holds out the strong hope that the current Iraqi awareness
of the danger of civil war will be an important factor in reducing the
possibility of this conclusion. Nevertheless, this report also assumes
that the prospect of this sort of civil conﬂict is sufﬁciently serious as
to warrant detailed consideration despite the fact that it is only one
of many possibilities and hopefully not the most likely outcome for
the future of Iraq.
The scope of this monograph is conﬁned to the Middle East,
which is where Iraqi ethnic and sectarian strife will almost certainly
have the greatest implications for regional stability and U.S. foreign
and military policy. If Iraqi violence erupts along religious/sectarian
v

and ethnic lines, this conﬂict will have thunderous echoes
throughout the area. Group identity, which is critical throughout
much of the Middle East, will provide a compelling context for
regional bystanders watching ethnic and sectarian bloodshed. Such
a conﬂagration will undoubtedly inﬂuence regional co-religionists
and ethnic kin of the embattled communities within Iraq. Many
individuals and nations would feel compelled to take sides. Some,
perhaps many, young men will consider traveling to Iraq to join
the ﬁght. Moreover, various nations would involve themselves in
the ﬁghting in ways up to and including the possibility of military
intervention. Additionally, intercommunal harmony and tolerance
in other regional states may suffer as the result of Iraqi ﬁghting and
the responses of neighboring governments to that ﬁghting.
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STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF INTERCOMMUNAL
WARFARE IN IRAQ
Introduction: The Challenge of Avoiding Catastrophic EthnoReligious Conﬂict.
Iraqi is a heterogeneous society divided along ethnic, tribal, and
religious lines as well as those of political orientation and ideology.
Around 60-65 percent of Iraqis are Shi’ite Arabs, 15-20 percent are
Sunni Muslim Arabs, and 15-20 percent are Kurds. Turkomans,
Assyrians, and other minorities constitute about 5 percent of the Iraqi
population, according to unclassiﬁed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
ﬁgures.1 Divisions among these groups are, to some extent, mitigated
by urbanization and intermarriage among Sunni and Shi’ite Arabs.
Such intermarriage is both accepted and widespread among Sunni and
Shi’ite Arabs in Iraq, but has not eliminated intercommunal differences
or the danger of intercommunal violence in the post-Saddam era.
The toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime in April 2003 ended
an era in which Iraqi sectarian, religious, tribal, regional, and other
differences were contained and manipulated (but not always suppressed)
against a background of unyielding tyranny. Saddam’s strategy for rule
included numerous circumstances of manipulating ethnic and tribal
loyalties, although repression was always his ultimate fallback position
to control the population.2 The future of Iraq is now uncertain, as the
country must address its internal difﬁculties in ways that are entirely
different from those of the Saddam regime.
This report is an attempt to address some of the issues associated
with these concerns. It assumes that the strategic implications of an Iraqi
civil war are sufﬁciently serious as to warrant detailed consideration
despite the fact that this is only one of many possibilities and not
necessarily the most likely possibility for the future of Iraq. Serious
ethno-religious conﬂict and especially a full-scale civil war in postSaddam Iraq would present the United States, the West, and the region
with a variety of severe strategic problems. Such an outcome is only one
of Iraq’s potential futures, but a number of key observers have noted
that such an Iraqi civil war is at least possible. United Nations (UN)
Ambassador Brahimi has warned of this danger, while various academic
and research organizations have expressed similar fears.3 Some U.S.
journalistic sources, citing what they describe as leaked documents,
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also suggest that the U.S. CIA is concerned about the danger of an Iraqi
civil war.4 Indeed, public opinion data also indicates that many Iraqis
are concerned over the possibility of a civil war in the post-Saddam era,
while some foreign Arab leaders have expressed similar concerns.5
Obviously, the danger of civil war is particularly pressing for the
United States, if this eventuality occurs while signiﬁcant numbers of
U.S. military forces remain in Iraq. Civil war under these circumstances
is nevertheless unlikely since U.S. and allied troops in Iraq are currently
serving as a deterrent to serious intercommunal ﬁghting. Another more
realistic scenario is that widespread ethnic and sectarian ﬁghting breaks
out during or shortly after a major U.S. troop withdrawal, when these
forces are no longer able to prevent Iraqi communities from challenging
each other over conﬂicting demands for political representation, power
and resources. It is also possible that civil war will be staved off for
years, but then ﬁnally break out in response to changing internal
political events or efforts by one group to consolidate disproportionate
levels of power. The most desirable alternative is, of course, for Iraqi
sectarian groups to resolve their differences without resorting to
violence of any kind. A key requirement for achieving this outcome will
be the development of a broad based and legitimate Iraqi government
supported by respected and professional Iraqi security forces willing to
protect that government.
If the new Iraqi leadership fails in its efforts to prevent catastrophic
levels of sectarian violence, leaders throughout the region will feel the
need to respond to the unfolding crisis. Most of Iraq’s neighbors fear a
deeply-fragmented Iraq as a potentially destabilizing threat to their own
domestic politics and tranquility. Many are especially concerned about
the possibility of an Iraqi civil war. Yet, many of these governments will
also face domestic political pressures to involve themselves ever more
deeply in Iraq’s troubles, should an intercommunal war break out.
Some governments will also see opportunities to expand their inﬂuence
in Iraq in ways that either contradict or support U.S. goals in the region.
Seasoned terrorists and inexperienced, but angry, young men may also
enter the strategic equation as they involve themselves with Iraqi ethnic
or sectarian warfare.
How an Ethnic-Sectarian War Might Ignite and Develop in Iraq.
Many Western observers reﬂexively view Western-style democracy
as the way to address the divisions within Iraq society that may
2

lead to severe civil conﬂict. Nevertheless, the birth of democracy
and development of ethnic and sectarian harmony are not always
closely related, and a number of important challenges will have to be
addressed for Iraq to evolve into a viable democracy that protects the
rights of all religious and ethnic groups.6 Should Iraqis be unable to
meet the challenges of accommodating and regulating key differences
while forming a functioning government, civil war becomes a serious
possibility.
Currently, Iraqis of differing ethnic and sectarian background are
discussing and agitating for alternative futures for their country in ways
that were forbidden during Saddam’s era. Disagreements over Iraq’s
future are, in some cases, undergoing a natural sharpening as issues and
competing visions of the future are discussed more fully and as various
groups demand what they perceive to be their rights. The danger is that
current disputes may become more angry and intractable over time. In
countries with well-established democratic institutions, patterns have
developed whereby parties, factions, and groups relinquish political
power with the certainty that they will be able to compete to regain
such power at a later point, such as a new election. Strong institutions
do not yet exist in Iraq, and many Iraqi citizens will be unwilling to
accept the actions of any government that they perceive as slighting
their ethnic or sectarian interests. These slighted groups may perceive
violence as a preferable option to waiting for future redistributing of
power through nonviolent means.7
A breakdown in civil order in Iraq, should it occur, would therefore
most likely be on ethnic and sectarian grounds, although ideological
and tribal differences might also be reﬂected in the ﬁghting. Ethnic
and sectarian ﬁghting in any country is often particularly bloody and
is usually viewed by many of the participants as zero-sum. Moreover,
Iraq’s brutal history may lead some among all three of Iraq’s major
groups (Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Shi’ite Arabs) to assume any such
struggle is not subject to compromise. Saddam’s murder of vast
numbers of Kurds and Shi’ite Arabs looms large in the consciousness of
both communities, which would correspondingly be reluctant to scale
back claims for power or autonomy. Additionally, smaller groups such
as the Turkomans have less capacity for self-defense, while maintaining
extremely serious differences with the Arabs and Kurds over such issues
as the future of the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk. Their most effective
strategy in a civil war would be to seek Turkish diplomatic and perhaps
military intervention.
3

As noted, this work does not predict an inevitable civil war, but
there are aspects of such a crisis that will start to emerge before any
large-scale ﬁghting, and observers need to be attentive to these factors.
An important indicator of problems associated with intercommunal
civil war is the development of uncompromising political leaders
within Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian communities. Ironically, these people
can be particularly dangerous in a democratic setting, where power
is redistributed periodically through elections because leaders must
outbid each other for a following within the community. Sociologist
Andreas Wimmer and ethnonationalism scholar Donald Horowitz
have examined this process in depth, and each has warned that it can
lead to a radicalization of ethnic politics whereby ethnic and sectarian
divisions are sharpened and rendered increasingly difﬁcult to resolve.8
Major national leaders seldom plan to ignite civil wars within
their own countries. Rather, such conﬂicts usually result from
escalating societal confrontations that cannot be resolved peacefully
by compromise or the use of domestic institutions. Violence, in turn,
sometimes spirals to exceptionally high levels. At such a point, it is
likely that even individuals who have given little thought to their ethnic
or sectarian identities would have to reemphasize them in response to
any escalating intercommunal crisis. Few people will have the luxury of
neutrality under such conditions, and most would be forced to choose
sides. Long-standing friendships across ethnic and sectarian divides
usually end under these circumstances, and mixed ethnic or sectarian
families are forced to choose one side or another or split.9
One particularly serious indicator of a developing crisis would be an
unwillingness of Iraq’s major communities to compromise on issues of
power sharing. There may also be considerable difﬁculties in dividing
resources, such as oil wealth, among communities in a way that satisﬁes
all of those involved. Moreover, an easy or amicable division of Iraq
into separate political entities is virtually impossible. In many areas,
populations are highly mixed. Baghdad itself is almost evenly divided
between Shi’ite and Sunni Arabs by some estimates, and it also has a
sizable Kurdish population.10 Additionally, many of Iraq’s economic
resources, including a large portion of the oil industry, are in disputed
territory. This situation suggests that the stakes associated with any kind
of a territorial division will be staggering. It is inconceivable that any
of Iraq’s major groups will give them up without at least considering
violence.
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The danger of civil war is much closer if political differences appear
to become irreconcilable and negotiations between groups break down.
The factor that allows these types of disputes among communities
to devolve into civil war is the capacity of various sides to employ
violence effectively. In Iraq, this capacity now exists among all major
groups due to the rise of regional and sectarian militias, a process that
began occurring immediately after Saddam’s removal. Some of these
groups returned to Iraq after political exile following the elimination
of the former regime. Others existed in Iraqi Kurdish areas outside
of Saddam’s control since 1991, while still others were established
within Iraq following Saddam’s ouster. The growth in militia activity
is a natural by-product of an insecure political environment in which
security is not effectively guaranteed by national level political and
security organizations. Since the individual cannot depend on the state to
provide security, self-defense becomes imperative. A variety of militias
are thereby able to assume the tasks of self-defense and security for
various portions of their sectarian or ethnic community. These militias
may also be used as instruments of domestic political aggression and
are usually only accountable to a small leadership core. Militias may
therefore protect some members of an ethnic or sectarian group from
outsiders, while simultaneously exploiting and intimidating the same
people to ensure their own dominance over them.
Immediately following Saddam’s ouster, the U.S. leadership hoped
that militias would not take root in the Iraqi political system, and strong
efforts were made to pressure them into dissolving.11 This hope has
now proven illusory, and senior U.S. ofﬁcials acknowledge the need
to tolerate some militia activity.12 Kurdish leaders even took offense at
having their forces referred to as militias.13 Senior U.S. policymakers
currently suggest that militias will become unnecessary as legitimate
governmental security institutions are strengthened, and militias are
replaced or absorbed by national and regional governmental security
forces.
Most major Iraqi militias are associated with religious and ethnic
political parties, although some are also tribal. As such, these militias
would be expected to ﬁght in the interests of their sectarian or ethnic
communities, should relations among Iraqi communities decline or
collapse. A massive Shi’ite electoral victory will unquestionably serve
as a spur to the further development of Sunni and Kurdish militias since
the Shi’ites would then appear closer to the control of national military
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institutions including security forces. Sunni Arabs and Kurds could at
that point wonder if the national military could eventually evolve into
a force devoted primarily to the welfare of the Shi’ite community.
If ﬁghting among the radical fringes of Iraq’s major communities
develops, various sectarian and ethnic militias could be drawn into
the ﬁghting. Once mainstream militias begin ﬁghting each other, full
scale intercommunal war may well follow, unless Iraqi security forces
can contain and then suppress (although not necessarily eliminate) the
ﬁghting. Moreover, under these circumstances, individual Iraqi soldiers,
national guardsmen, and other security forces would be subjected to
strongly conﬂicting loyalties. They would have to either remain in the
Iraqi military or desert, depending upon the circumstances of the civil
conﬂict, particularly regarding their home community. It is especially
likely that numerous soldiers would desert if they felt that that army
was being used to crush the aspirations of their own ethnic or sectarian
group. Such individuals would probably desert with their weapons and
join the militias associated with their home communities in a similar
process as that of the disintegration of the Lebanese Army during
Lebanon’s 1975-91 civil war.14 Such a collapse can be quite rapid and
difﬁcult to reverse once it has started.15
Other problems exist as well. Border security is a major problem in
contemporary Iraq and will become an even more serious predicament
should Iraq be engulfed by civil war.16 Currently, U.S. and other
coalition forces are providing at least some limited border security.
Most of the projected Iraqi border security force is still undergoing
extensive recruiting, training, and organizational development. The
effort is, however, moving forward, and border security will improve
as these new units are equipped and put into place. Unfortunately, the
Iraqi border force will almost certainly crumble without a functioning
central government to provide logistical support and pay should
civil war conditions begin to develop. Iraq’s borders would thus
become much more porous and subject to inﬁltration by terrorists
and criminals. Moreover, a civil war in Iraq could also be expected to
produce signiﬁcant and perhaps severe levels of cross border refugees,
creating the possibility of a humanitarian crisis. Large refugee camps
associated with humanitarian relief programs would become centers
of discontent and could correspondingly serve as recruitment pools for
terrorists ﬁghting inside Iraq.
An Iraqi civil war would also undoubtedly attract and generate
extremely high levels of terrorist activity just as the Lebanese civil war
6

did in that country. Without a strong central government, international
terrorists would have considerable leeway to establish enclaves
and power bases, while local combatants could be expected to allow
terrorists to operate in exchange for money, weapons, and other
support. Additionally, established terrorist groups, such as that of the
Abu Musab al Zarqawi group, will seek to expand their power and
inﬂuence in the aftermath of a breakdown of internal security. Under
civil war conditions, some terrorists would support their co-religionists
in sectarian ﬁghting, while others may simply seek to remove any
last vestiges of U.S. inﬂuence from Iraq. Indeed, based on a variety of
evidence, Zarqawi is widely believed to be seeking to foment an Iraqi
civil war as the price of a radical new government that he hopes will
emerge from the ashes of such a conﬂict.17
Moreover, the prestige of Islamic terrorists in the Muslim World
could be expected to rise dramatically if they managed to wrest
control of substantial portions of Iraq’s territory from a pro-American
government in Baghdad or appear close to victory in a civil war. The
spectacle of victorious Islamists in Iraq would be a powerful source of
attraction for unemployed, directionless young men across the Muslim
World seeking to ﬁnd some meaning for their lives. Young men without
serious economic prospects and harboring strong but muddled antiAmerican feelings may see an anti-American jihad as an adventure
that would give meaning to their lives. Thus, an Iraq in civil war could
become an incubator for anti-American terrorists because of the desire
to bring forth an anti-American vanguard state out of the civil war, the
need for what radical Palestinian leader George Habbash once called an
“Arab Hanoi.”18
If civil war breaks out in Iraq, the United States will also be widely
blamed in the Arab World, despite strong U.S. efforts to prevent such
an eventuality through the thankless job of refereeing Iraqi factions.
The U.S. decision to invade Iraq and restructure the Iraqi political
order will be seen as the essential cause of any failure. Moreover, in
Iraq and the rest of the Arab World, the United States will probably be
widely assumed to have incited a civil war deliberately. Many Arab
commentators have clearly stated their belief that the United States
invaded Iraq to exploit its oil resources and to protect Israel and not
because the United States had any particular concern about liberating
the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein.19 Arab conspiracy theorists
would undoubtedly latch on to the outbreak of civil war as a deliberate
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U.S. plan to safeguard both of these goals, however unlikely this may
seem to more dispassionate observers.
The Shi´ite-Sunni Arab Divide in Iraq.
Sunni Muslim Arabs have dominated all Iraqi governments from
the formation of the state until the ouster of Saddam Hussein. Sunni
preeminence in Mesopotamia dates back to Ottoman times, although
mass conversions from Sunni to Shi’ite Islam also occurred during the
1800s throughout what is now southern Iraq.20 Following World War
I, the British installed a monarchy under King Feisal of the Hashemite
family to function as Iraq’s leader. King Feisal, himself a Sunni, enjoyed
some genuine popularity in Iraq, but nevertheless depended heavily
upon Sunni ofﬁcers (especially Mesopotamian ofﬁcers) who served
with him during the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turks
(1916-18).21 The Hashemites also formed political alliances with Iraq’s
Sunni urban elite, and displayed favoritism to Sunnis for administrative
and military positions.22 Some British ofﬁcials may also have favored
bringing Sunnis into the government because they considered Sunnis
as less complicit in the nationalist Revolt of 1920 (although the British
were also quite confused about the revolt’s origin and causes).23 Iraqi
military ofﬁcers during the initial years of the monarchy were almost all
Sunnis.24 Sunni ascendancy survived the 1958 revolution, and reached
its height during the era of Saddam Hussein.
During their years of political hegemony, many Sunni Arabs worried
that they would be forced to pay for their history of discrimination against
the Shi’ites if the roles were ever reversed and the Shi’ites were able
somehow to dominate Iraq. This concern became especially pronounced
during Saddam Hussein’s years in power, which included an 8-year
war against Shi’ite Iran. Additionally, Iraq’s Sunni Arab community
did not join in the post-DESERT STORM 1991 Shi’ite rebellion to oust
the Ba’ath, and many Sunnis instead rallied to Saddam. Republican
Guard tanks crushing the rebellion were often painted with the slogan,
“No more Shi’ites after today.”25 These forces razed villages, massacred
civilians, and established a horrendous death toll while crushing the
rebellion. The Sunni community’s quiescence during this period may
have further widened the gap between the two communities.
Currently, many Iraqi Sunni Arabs feel politically besieged, and
some appear to believe that the United States seeks to punish them for

8

Saddam Hussein’s crimes and that the United States favors a Shi’ite
dominated government.26 In the aftermath of Saddam’s removal, Sunnis
lost a brutal dictator who was nevertheless a member of their community
and a leader who favored Sunni Arabs over Iraq’s other ethnic and
sectarian groups. Promises of democracy are not always attractive to the
Sunnis since they can never constitute a electoral majority by themselves.
Should sectarian divisions become entrenched political divides, their
limited numbers will marginalize them indeﬁnitely. Many Sunni Arabs
were also alienated by the de-Ba’athiﬁcation process, which they felt
was directed primarily at them throughout the beginning of the postSaddam era. A variety of critics, including Prime Minister Ayad Allawi
(a secular Shi’ite), now feel that the sweeping initial de-Ba’athiﬁcation
policy was one of the most serious U.S. mistakes in the post-Saddam
era.27 Additionally, the abolition of the Saddam era army was of special
concern since the ofﬁcer corps of that force was heavily Sunni Arab.
Iraq’s Sunni Arabs are also faring poorly in the effort to reorganize
themselves to compete politically in post-Saddam Iraq. No Sunnioriented political parties currently appear equipped to accomplish
this task, and some Sunni leaders call for a boycott of the January
30, 2005, elections. Well-organized, mass political parties, which
can vastly increase voter turnout, operate in the Kurdish and Shi’ite
communities, but not in the Sunni community.28 The resistance to the
U.S. presence and the new Iraqi government is also currently strongest
in the Sunni community, and support for the insurgency may distract
from any potential Sunni effort to take hold of a share of power within
the framework of the new government. Many non-Iraqi Sunni Arabs,
especially in the Gulf, fear a possible U.S. decision to align with
Shi’ites Muslims as a strategy for inﬂuencing the Muslim World due to
exasperation with the Sunni insurgents.
Some Sunni Arab leaders are also worried about the Kurds and
may fear Kurdish-Shi’ite cooperation directed against them. At least
some Sunnis also believe that Kurdish military units played a major
role in coalition attacks against Fallujah in April 2004. While many
individual members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corp (later renamed the
Iraqi National Guard) units operating in Fallujah were Kurdish, it is
not clear that these forces were operating as primarily Kurdish units.29
It is possible that disproportionately Kurdish units moved against the
Fallujah radicals since the Kurdish members of the National Guard are
often the most reliable troops in that organization, and since the ﬁghting
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in Fallujah was particularly intense. True or not, this interpretation of
events gathered force, and many Kurds living in Fallujah chose to leave
afterwards.
Yet, if the Sunnis carry the psychological baggage of lost dominance,
Shi’ites must address a heritage of horriﬁc sectarian repression that
has thoroughly traumatized their community. Saddam, who was an
untrusting leader at best, always kept an especially wary eye on the
majority Shi’ites. This concern reached new heights in 1979 with the rise
of a militant Shi’ite Islamic regime in Iran. Iranian calls for regionwide
Islamic revolution and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War caused the Ba’ath
leaders to view Iraqi Shi’ites as a potential ﬁfth column that was all too
willing to side with Iran under the right circumstances. Iraq’s Shi’ite
Arabs nevertheless remained loyal to their country during this conﬂict,
probably because they were ﬁghting a foreign enemy. In 1991, however,
a different set of circumstances applied in the aftermath of Saddam’s
defeat during Operation DESERT STORM. Shi’ites rose against Saddam
and the Ba’ath party to overturn his government in an action that may
have been viewed as equally patriotic as resisting the Iranians.
Virtually all Iraqi Shi’ites view any return to a system of Sunni
domination of Iraq as unacceptable due to the horror of the recent past.
The Shi’ite political leadership, including Iraq’s most senior cleric, Grand
Ayatollah Sistani, have repeatedly emphasized that they favor an Iraqi
democracy as promised by the United States when it ousted Saddam.
To these leaders, democracy is a majority rule political system, which
they may also view as a winner-take-all system. Moreover, most major
Shi’ite leaders have resisted all formulas to increase Sunni representation beyond that of their numbers to encourage their integration into
the political process. Grand Ayatollah Sistani, for example, took an
exceptionally dim view of an early post-Saddam American plan to use
“regional caucuses” as a voting device, since this program would have
diminished the importance of Shi’ite numbers. He and other Shi’ite
leaders have also told their followers that voting is a moral duty.30
Violence between Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’ite communities exists but
appears limited and conﬁned to the fringes of each community. One
particularly appalling incident of possible anti-Shi’ite violence occurred
with the assassination of Shi’ite political leader, Mohammad Bakr al
Hakim, and at least 80 other people by a bomb set in front of a Najaf
mosque in August 2003. This attack is suspected of being either antiShi’ite or a product of an inter-Shi’ite power struggle. Other attacks have
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been made against Shi’ite Mosques or pilgrims to Shi’ite shrines and
are sometimes suspected to be the actions of Sunni Muslim extremists.
The period immediately prior to the January 30 elections seems to have
been particularly tense. Some Sunni clerics accused “poisonous” Shi’ite
religious leaders of ignoring the U.S.-coalition November 2004 attack on
Fallujah, which was widely unpopular among many Sunni leaders.31
Incidents of suspected anti-Sunni violence by Shi’ite Muslims are less
common at the time of this writing. Many Shi’ites are widely believed
to be seeking to dominate the new Iraqi polity by force of numbers,
and therefore do not see violence as a ﬁrst resort. Nevertheless, antiSunni violence widely attributed to Shi’ite extremists has occurred.
In September 2004, for example, two prominent Sunni clerics were
assassinated in separate incidents in Sadr city, the Shi’ite area in Eastern
Baghdad.32 The rise of populist Shi’ite radicals, such as Muqtada al-Sadr,
increase the danger of sectarian violence should the radical fringes begin
to engage each other further and then threaten to expand their conﬂict
to the larger communities.
Strikes against Iraq’s tiny Christian community, apparently by
Sunni radicals, have also occurred on a recurring basis throughout the
post-Saddam era. Such persecution, while reprehensible, is not itself
an indicator of civil war since the Christians are too small as a group to
emerge as signiﬁcant combatants. The attacks do, however, indicate an
ongoing problem with religious intolerance, which can expand to other
groups.33
Iraqi Kurdish and Turkoman Ethnic Challenges.
The Kurdish question looms large in Iraq’s future and is closely
entwined with the danger of civil war. Currently, there are between 2835 million Kurds throughout the Middle East, making them one of the
largest nationalities in the world without their own state.34 In addition
to Iraq, other large Kurdish communities are located in Turkey, Syria,
and Iran. All of these states are concerned about the future directions
of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq, which they view as an important factor
inﬂuencing their own Kurds. Moreover, the closer a Kurdish state comes
to reality in northern Iraq, the more likely that these other regional
powers will ﬁnd ways to unify their efforts against it.35
In an important study of ethnic identity, Donald Horowitz suggests
that Iraqi Kurds went through a process of partial Arabization under a
succession of Arab regimes, but that they later experienced a cultural
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revival reﬂecting awareness that they could lose their group identity.36
A succession of Iraqi governments has nevertheless sought to suppress
the Kurdish identity, while the mainstream Kurdish leadership has
strongly resisted this effort. Moreover, the Kurds engaged in a series of
rebellions against Baghdad that, at times, threatened to unravel the Iraqi
state. Iraqi Kurds also collaborated with the Iranians during the IranIraq war in the hopes that they would make political gains following an
Iraqi defeat. Iraq was not defeated, however, and Saddam’s post-war
efforts to crush separatist Kurdish aspirations reached a new intensity
as he waged a genocidal campaign against Iraq’s Kurds to punish them
for their support to Tehran.37
Since 1991, Iraqi Kurds have enjoyed a semi-independent status
because of the creation of a UN-sponsored “safe haven” in northern
Iraq in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM. The safe haven
was protected by a U.S./UK-enforced “no ﬂy” zone (1991-2003) where
Iraqi aircraft were prohibited from operating. Theoretically, Iraqi troops
were not allowed to enter the area either, although this prohibition was
violated when Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani sought and obtained
Saddam’s military support against Kurdish rival Jalal Talabani in 1996.38
The Kurdish areas have mostly ﬂourished since 1991, and the Kurds have
reveled in their separate non-Arab/non-Iraqi identity. The Iraqi Kurds
substituted their own red, yellow, green, and white ﬂag in place of the
Iraqi national ﬂag throughout areas under their control.39 Many young
Kurds have stopped learning Arabic and have no apparent interest in a
joint Arab-Kurdish future.40 Now, in the aftermath of Saddam’s capture,
almost 2 million Kurds have signed a petition demanding a referendum
on Kurdish independence, although it is widely understood that such
independence would produce an angry backlash within Iraq and
throughout the region.41 In the Kurdish media, universities, and public
opinion, pro-independence sentiment is clear and overwhelming.
Faced with the danger of a regional backlash, the major Kurdish
leaders have asserted that “federalism” is the most acceptable solution
for governing Iraq, although when asked to describe the nature of
such an arrangement, their ideas appear more like a very loose
confederation.42 Moreover, most non-Kurds seem to view Kurdish-style
federalism as an intermediate step toward Kurdish independence. The
Kurdish leaders call for a federation of “nations,” with a partnership
between the Arab and Kurdish regions.43 Such “federalism” implies the
Kurdish control of northern oil, a particularly inﬂammatory issue. A
signiﬁcant portion of Iraq’s total oil infrastructure is in northern Iraq,
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especially around Kirkuk. The June 2004 assassination of Ghazi Talabani,
the head of oil ﬁeld security in northern Iraq, for example, is widely
believed to have been a warning against Kurdish ethnic and economic
separatism. Ghazi Talabani was from the same Kurdish clan as Jalal
Talabani, the head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), one of the
two major Kurdish political parties, advocating a more decentralized
form of Iraqi federalism.44
Iraqi Kurds seek to retain the militias associated with their major
political parties and ban non-Kurdish military units from their region.
Additionally, disarming Kurdish militias is not a realistic prospect. The
Kurds are aware that ethnic conﬂict is a realistic possibility, and they
are much more inclined to improve their military capabilities rather
than disarm. Moreover, the U.S. leadership has good reasons not to
press too tenaciously on this issue. The disarmament of the Kurdish
militias could lead to a power vacuum that will allow the expansion of
the al-Qa’ida afﬁliated terrorist group, Ansar al-Islam, which is based
in Kurdistan. Mainstream Kurdish militia forces include about 50,000
ﬁghters.45 Kurdish members of the New Iraqi Army openly state that
they will desert and return to Pesmerga (Kurdish irregular ﬁghters)
units if their Kurdish homeland is threatened.
Many Iranian, Syrian, and Turkish leaders doubt that the Iraqi Kurds
would be satisﬁed with their own independence, even if they were able
to achieve it. Rather, they assume that an independent Kurdish state in
territory carved out of Iraq would serve not only as an inspiration to
their own Kurdish populations, but also as a base for subversion against
the national unity of their respective countries. The Kurds are also faced
with solid opposition to “federalism” by most of the major leaders
within Iraq’s other communities. Indeed, Shi’ite religious leader Grand
Ayatollah Sistani denounced elements of the Interim Iraqi Constitution
that were designed to reassure the Kurds. To face these rivals, Iraqi
Kurds have attempted to bring the United States into their disputes,
apparently in the hope that the United States will lose patience with
the prospect of working with Shi’ite and Sunni Arabs. Many Kurdish
leaders have, for example, indicated that they favor an indeﬁnite U.S.
presence in northern Iraq.
Additionally, the Kurds have engaged in at least a limited forced
expulsion of non-Kurdish Iraqis from disputed areas of northern Iraq
including the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, and this type of activity could
expand dramatically in a period of increased sectarian strife.46 These
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population shifts involve ethnic Kurds returning to Kirkuk, Mosul, and
other areas of northern Iraq, while seeking to expel the Arabs that were
transplanted there during the “Arabization” effort.47 This effort began
in 1963 and was designed to replace the Kurds of northern Iraq with
Arabs. By April 2003, around 250,000 Arabs had been transplanted to the
Kirkuk area, and an equal number of Kurds were displaced. The Kurds
claim that Kirkuk is their “Jerusalem” and should serve as the capital
for the Kurdish region. This has been presented as a non-negotiable
issue for them, and Kurdish leaders suggest that Arabs brought to
Kirkuk under the Arabization program must leave, along with their
descendents.48
Another important ethnic group with a key role in the future of
northern Iraq and very different views from the Kurds and Arabs on
Kirkuk is the Turkomans. Turkomans are of ethnic Turkish heritage
and speak an archaic version of Turkish. They also write their language
according to the pre-Ataturk, non-Latinized version of the Turkish
language, using Arabic-style script. The Turkomans view Kirkuk as
their ancestral home and are deeply opposed to the idea that it may
become a Kurdish city. U.S. statistics suggest that the Turkomans are
only about 3 percent of the population, but they strongly object to this
characterization, maintaining instead that they constitute 10-15 percent
of the total population of Iraq.49 They have also contested the Kurdish
domination of the instruments of local government in Kirkuk, and
tensions between the two groups appear to be serious and perhaps
rising.50
Iran: Dangers and Opportunities Resulting from an Iraqi Civil War.
Turning from the internal situation in Iraq to that country’s neighbors,
Iran has an especially strong stake in Iraq’s future. It is likely that Tehran
might ﬁnd signiﬁcant opportunities to advance its regional agenda as
the result of an Iraqi civil war, but Iran may also be faced with severe,
perhaps regime-threatening, dangers because of such an eventuality.
Tehran fought an exceptionally bloody 8-year war against Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq from 1980-88, and the Iranian leadership knows the price
of a powerful and unfriendly regime in Baghdad. Correspondingly, the
Iranian regime will almost certainly feel compelled to intervene in any
Iraqi civil conﬂict, although it may do so in ways short of military force.
Tehran can also be expected to claim that it strongly supports Iraqi
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national unity, while the Iranian leadership nevertheless realizes that
a dismembered Iraq fragmented into multiple “de facto” states offers
Tehran a less threatening and more easily dominated western neighbor.
Additionally, Iranian policy directed at Iraq may not always appear
coherent due to internal Iranian divisions which can cause various
intelligence and foreign policy bureaucracies to act independently of
each other and sometimes even at cross-purposes.
It is unclear if the Iranian leadership, behind closed doors, favors
a uniﬁed Iraq or a weak chaotic Iraq. There are advantages and
drawbacks to each option. The possibility of a strong and stable Iraq
is undoubtedly of serious concern to the Iranians since such an entity
could develop into a committed and dangerous enemy. Currently, a
number of outstanding differences remain between Iraq and Iran over
territory, Iran-Iraq War reparations, and other issues. A strong and
assertive Iraq would be in a good position to challenge the Iranians
over these differences. Additionally, tensions have already developed
with the Iraqi interim government. The Iranians have described Prime
Minister Iyad Allawi’s government as U.S. “lackeys,” and Allawi
has returned the charge by stating that Iran is engaged in a vigorous
espionage campaign within Iraq. Defense Minister Hazem al Sha’alan,
for example, has stated that Iran seeks to “kill democracy” in his
country.51 Sha’alan is also reported by al Jazirah television as having
referred to Iran as “Iraq’s arch-enemy,” suggesting that current Iranian
meddling in Iraq is simply the latest manifestation of continuing Iranian
efforts to dominate the Iraqis.52 Although other Iraqi leaders have
backed away from Sha’alan’s statements, such remarks undoubtedly
reﬂect the sentiment of many Iraqi citizens who deeply distrust Iran.
Iraqi ofﬁcials have also charged that Iranian intelligence organizations
are deeply involved in Iraqi politics, and some Iraqi leaders privately
state that Iranian spies and saboteurs have been executed.53 While
execution claims are unconﬁrmed, they do reﬂect a vehemence that may
be instructive on the level of hostility between at least some members of
the two governments.
The Tehran leadership also fears that a uniﬁed and pro-Western
Iraq could help facilitate an attack against the Iranian homeland at
some future point. At least some of the Iranian leadership felt their
own government was slated for near-term regime change after the fall
of Baghdad. The U.S. identiﬁcation of the Iranian regime as part of an
“axis of evil” was of serious concern to the ruling clerics, many of whom
seemed to fear that the United States would attack them after Iraq had
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been stabilized through military means. Shortly after the fall of Baghdad,
former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani suggested that the United
States and Iran restore diplomatic ties in a symptom of nervousness
about future U.S. action against Iran.54 Calls for U.S.-Iranian dialogue by
Iranian leaders have continued periodically up to the present date, but
new problems have also emerged.55 Current differences over the Iranian
nuclear program are particularly serious. Tehran claims to be interested
in a full fuel cycle nuclear program for exclusively peaceful purposes,
the most important of which is power generation. The U.S. Government
fears that Iran is also seeking a nuclear weapon. The possibility of a
U.S.-Iranian military confrontation over this issue cannot be ruled out,
although there would be enormous difﬁculties for the United States in
conducting such military operations at this time.56
Tehran also fears an Iraqi government that is willing to accept
permanent U.S. military bases that may be used to threaten and intimidate
the Iranian regime, even if a U.S. attack is not immediately forthcoming.57
Since the 9/11 attacks against the United States, Iranian leaders have
watched their strategic situation erode as the United States has expanded
its inﬂuence and military presence in states near Iran to a degree that
some view as “encirclement.”58 The United States reinvigorated its ties
with Pakistan and expanded military links with Islamabad in order to
confront the Taliban regime. Additionally, Washington has established
strong military relationships with a variety of former Soviet Central
Asian republics to Iran’s north. These relationships remain important
with ongoing U.S. military operations in Afghanistan against a resurgent
Taliban.59 Moreover, Washington also installed a new government in
Afghanistan, although that government appears willing to co-exist with
pro-Iranian ﬁgures in Western Afghanistan.60 While the Iranians were
never close to the Taliban regime and in 1998 almost went to war with
Taliban Afghanistan, a U.S.-dominated Afghanistan may not be seen as
much of an improvement.61
Iran has other serious concerns about a united Iraq even in the
absence of a strong U.S.-Iraqi relationship. The Iranians, at some level,
would favor an Iraqi religious theocracy, but there are dangers here
as well. Tehran could feel threatened by an Iraqi government heavily
inﬂuenced by clerics who outshine the Iranian theological leadership
or are in a position to challenge the Iranian leadership’s interpretation
of correct principles of Islamic government and policy. Some Iranian
media sources have even expressed fear that the United States seeks
to work against the Iranian government through domination of Iraq’s
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Najaf clergy.62 The current Iranian Supreme Religious Guide (rahbar),
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is probably particularly concerned about
highly respected religious ﬁgures advising the new leaders of Iraq, since
he maintains only modest credentials as an Islamic scholar. Moreover,
in a possible harbinger of serious problems, Iranian dissidents have
approached Grand Ayatollah Sistani in an effort to persuade him to
issue fatwas (religious opinions) on issues involving the Iranian political
process.63 Should Sistani reverse himself at some point and intervene,
this would present unpleasant complications for the Iranian regime’s
already ﬂagging domestic political legitimacy. While Sistani’s fatwas
are only authoritative for individual Shi’ites who have accepted him
as their marja al taqlid, or “source of emulation,” they may also carry
at least some weight for a wider body of people throughout the Shi’ite
community.
Yet, if Tehran does not want an Iraqi government guided by
independent-minded religious scholars, neither does it desire a
government led by reckless, radical Islamists. Such individuals might
help to drag Tehran into confrontation with the United States by
committing irresponsible acts that are then perhaps incorrectly linked
to the Iranians by U.S. policymakers. The Iranians must therefore be
careful not to support radicals they cannot control, while nevertheless
avoiding the alienation of clerical and other leaders who are willing to
cooperate with them. The case of Muqtada al-Sadr and other members
of his movement may be particularly problematic, although the
Iranians are almost certainly providing him with support and clearly
seek to inﬂuence him. It is, nevertheless, unclear if Tehran can restrain
and control him during a time of crisis, and this is probably the most
pressing question for Iran in its dealings with Sadr. Tehran also has
concerns that he may be an extreme Arab nationalist with an ethnic
bias against the Iranians.64 The Iranian leadership may not have come
to grips with these conﬂicting views of Sadr.
Some Iranian leaders appear to view Sadr as a useful potential ally
with whom they might cooperate in the same way they have worked
with the leadership of the Lebanese group, Hizballah. Hizballah, under
the leadership of the radical and relatively young Secretary-General
Hassan Nasrallah, is an important political party in Lebanon with an
extensive following among the poor and considerable inﬂuence over the
future of the country.65 In its early stages of existence, the group received
Iranian money and was especially receptive to Iranian inﬂuence without
being dominated by Tehran.66 Iranian inﬂuence over Hizballah has
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continued to decline as the party has become more institutionalized and
entrenched in Lebanese politics, but the relationship remains friendly
and cooperative. Sadr’s movement has parallels with Hizballah, and
Tehran may view the Hizballah model as instructive to Iraq under current
circumstances. Nevertheless, Sadr is not as intelligent or sophisticated
as Nasrallah, and Sadr’s actions can attract unwelcome U.S. activity to
Iran’s doorstep in a way that Hizballah activity in Lebanon cannot.
While the Iranians may envision potential difﬁculties with an
independent minded, Shi’ite-dominated government, they are even
more deeply concerned about the possibility of an Iraqi government
that is once again led or heavily inﬂuenced by Sunni Muslims, even
if these people are hostile to the United States. Currently, the proinsurgent portion of the Sunni community appears dominated by Sunni
Islamic extremists known for their view of Shi’ites as apostates and
former regime loyalists who once supported Saddam’s Arab nationalist
aversion to the Iranians and their regime. Obviously, a strong Iraqi
government inﬂuenced by either of these factions would provide
difﬁculties for Tehran.
Yet, while Iran may face severe problems with a uniﬁed or powerful
Iraq, it could face even more severe problems with an Iraq in civil war.
The Tehran leadership would ﬁnd the formulation of an Iraq policy to
be an exhausting and divisive exercise for their already badly divided
government. Different factions within the Iranian government would
favor different levels of risk associated with different levels of intervention and may also seek dissimilar results. Hardline Iranian Islamists
would probably seek a like-minded Iraqi leadership in Baghdad to
pressure moderates within Iran. Iranian reformers would be more likely
to seek a liberal Islamic government in Baghdad. Additionally, Iran also
has a Kurdish population that may be inspired if a strongly autonomous
or independent Kurdish entity arose in northern Iraq. Iranian efforts
to address these domestic problems, while simultaneously seeking to
expand its inﬂuence in Iraq will be a major challenge. Finally, the West
may blame Iran for aggravating civil war-related problems, thereby
threatening Tehran’s dialogue with Europe and potentially further
antagonizing the United States.
On balance, the Iranians therefore probably do not favor an Iraqi
civil war, but it is certainly likely that Tehran will take advantage of
any such eventuality should it occur. Tehran’s perceptions of its own
vital interests would probably propel the Iranians to become heavily
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involved with Iraq, although they would probably intervene in ways
that do not involve large-scale conventional military operations. They
would also attempt to conceal their involvement to the greatest extent
possible.67 Neutrality in such a conﬂict is unthinkable because Iran has
vital interests related to the future Iraqi government. Rather, the Iranians
would seek to support the Shi’ite community, while simultaneously
bolstering pro-Iranian elements within that community. Moreover, the
emergence of a strong, Arab nationalist government in Baghdad may
increase the Iranian interest in supporting centrifugal forces, since such
a government can reasonably be expected to emerge as an important
rival to Tehran.
An Iraq in the midst of sectarian war would allow Iran some latitude
to support pro-Iranian Shi’ites at the expense of their secular or antiIranian co-religionists, and thus help enable pro-Iranian groups to
dominate the Shi’ite community and perhaps prevail in a sectarian war.
Tehran will seek to formulate policies that maximize its own interests
within Iraq, while minimizing the inﬂuence of the United States and
potential regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia. Such an approach would
involve supporting some factions at the expense of others, in a policy
that would create enemies as well as friends. Tehran will also seek to
expand its inﬂuence in ways that do not produce a signiﬁcant backlash
with either the United States or the Iraqis themselves. The vigilance of
U.S-led coalition forces in the region, and the long history of IranianIraqi conﬂict makes such a task difﬁcult.
Iran can also be expected to be able to make use of a wide spectrum
of individuals, institutions, and organizations to inﬂuence the outcome
of a civil war. Some of these organizations are arms of Iranian foreign
policy, such as the Iranian intelligence services. Others are Iraqi exile
groups which have had close working relations with the Iranians
for years or even decades. Two of Iraq’s largest political parties,
Da’wa Islamiyya and especially the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), have long histories of political cooperation
with Iran. SCIRI is now emerging from a dependent relationship with
Iran and currently has at least the option for increased independence.
Da’wa was once one of Iraq’s most important political parties but was
badly decimated in its confrontations with Saddam, and subsequently
became radical and pro-Iranian. Its ties to Tehran were never as strong
as those of SCIRI, and Da’wa is probably somewhat more willing to
act independently of Tehran. Nevertheless, Iranian backing still has
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advantages for all parties involved, and Da’wa and SCIRI are currently
maintaining friendly relations with Tehran.68 Additionally, the Iranians
have also sought inﬂuence with a variety of secular Iraqi leaders,
including Ahmad Chalabi.69 Some observers have also suggested that
Iran may even compete for inﬂuence with the Iraqi Kurds under some
circumstances. Iran may also seek a mediation and power-breaking
role among factions, although such activities make enemies as well as
allies.
Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon.
Turkish goals for Iraq have considerable overlap with those of the
United States. Ankara is not threatened by the possibility of a democratic
Iraq, and the Turks also strongly favor Iraqi national unity under most
future circumstances. Additionally, most Turkish leaders strongly
approve of a secular Iraq, rather than an Islamic, republic. The Turkish
leadership operates within the framework of a secular Westernized state
as envisioned by the Turkish Republic’s revered founding President
Kamal Ataturk. Over the last decade, Ataturk’s ideals have been
challenged by a growing Islamic movement in that country, but there
has also been a strong backlash against the Islamists. In this regard, it
is important to look beyond the current self-described “conservative”
Turkish government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his
Justice and Development Party, which includes many Turkish leaders
who have previously tilted towards Islamist principles. The Prime
Minister is among this group, although he now claims that religion is
a private matter and that he is loyal to the secular vision of Ataturk.70
Additionally, the Turkish military leadership is deeply concerned about
radical Islamist activity, and military leaders are in a strong position to
insist that it be opposed forcefully. Turkey’s 1982 Constitution and the
1961 Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law charge the military
with the duty of protecting and promoting the Ataturk system. The
military views this responsibility as quasi-sacred.71
Turkey traditionally has also been concerned about any autonomous
Kurdish region in Iraq that exhibits the characteristics of an independent
state and perhaps sets the stage for a formal declaration of independence.
Turkish suspicions of Iraqi Kurdish separatist intentions run high due
to a history of difﬁculties with the restive portion of Turkey’s own
Kurdish population. The modern Kurdish insurgency in Turkey began
in 1984 and was led by Kurdish Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkari Kurdistan
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[PKK]). It reached its height in the early and mid-1990s. By spring 1999,
it appears to have been defeated, and Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah
Ocalan was captured in Nairobi Airport.72 Nevertheless, the Turks are
extraordinarily sensitive about any threat to their national unity, and
they view any sign of Kurdish unrest as a serious concern.
A revitalized Kurdish insurgency in Turkey remains a potential threat
of ongoing concern to the Turkish government. Around 5,000 Kurdish
guerrillas of the former PKK, now known as Kongra-Gel (Kurdish
Peoples’ Congress) have retreated into the mountains of northern Iraq.
These ﬁghters maintained a cease-ﬁre with the Turkish government from
1999 until May 2004. In May 2004 Kongra-Gel made an announcement
that it would resume guerrilla warfare against Turkish military forces,
and has followed this announcement with some minor attacks.73 Should
Kongra-Gel escalate this effort, they would be faced with the strong
possibility of forceful Turkish military intervention in northern Iraq.
Turkey has requested that Iraq take action against Kongra-Gel units
in Iraq, but the Iraqi leadership responded that it is unable to do so
at this time due to shortcomings within its still developing military.74
Moreover, even if Iraq did have the military capability to confront
Kongra-Gel, it is doubtful that it would do so, as such actions would
inﬂame already fragile Arab-Kurdish relations within Iraq.
Additionally, the Turks traditionally have been reluctant to grant
the Kurdish minority wide-ranging cultural and language rights
or allow outspoken Kurdish nationalist politicians to serve in the
Turkish parliament.75 Rather, Ankara has consistently viewed serious
concessions to the Kurds as intermediate steps leading to demands
for new concessions. This outlook is now being challenged, and a “go
slow” approach to Kurdish political and cultural rights is replacing the
more rigid policies of the past. This new approach allows such things
as a limited number of radio programs in the Kurdish language and
the teaching of Kurdish in private schools.76 The Turks therefore are
working actively against the possibility of a Kurdish state, while at the
same time giving their own Kurds small doses of cultural liberalization.77
There is also some tension over issues of liberalization. The Turks seem
determined to go forward with these reforms, but they also recognize
that risks are involved and that concessions on Kurdish culture and
language could lead to increasing political demands.78 This sensitive
situation could be severely aggravated by events in Iraq.79
The Turkish government leaders will also become extremely
apprehensive about the situation in Kirkuk during any future Iraqi
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civil war. Kirkuk is viewed by the Kurds as a natural capital for any
emerging Kurdish state. This view is sharply contested by the Arab
and Turkoman populations of the city. The well-being of the Turkoman
population is an ongoing concern for the Turkish public, and it would
be difﬁcult for the Turkish government to ignore this issue, even if they
wished to do so.80 The Turkish leadership’s ﬁercely protective outlook
concerning the Turkomans was underscored in September 2004 during
U.S. operations in the northern Iraqi town of Tel Afar. U.S. military
operations against insurgent forces in the area became a subject of
deep Turkish unhappiness when Turkoman ofﬁcials claimed a number
of civilians had been killed as part of the struggle for control of the
area. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul threatened to end Turkish
cooperation with the United States over Iraq if the action continued.
The crisis ended a day after Gul issued these threats, when U.S. military
actions in this area were completed.81
Under these pressures, the Turkish leadership is searching for
creative ways in which to address unfavorable developments in Iraq.
One scenario that is increasingly popular among Turkish academics is
for Ankara to offer cooperation and protection to the Iraqi Kurds should
a radical Islamic regime arise in southern Iraq.82 This scenario assumes
that, if Islamic radicals seize control of the Iraq government, Iraqi Kurds
will then be willing to overlook potential differences with Turkey in
order to avoid subservience to an Islamic regime in Baghdad. The Turks
by intervening establish a powerful check on future Iraqi Kurdish moves
towards independence and also insure that a relatively secularized
population of Kurdish Muslims serve as a barrier to Islamic agitation
and militancy against the Turkish homeland. Turkish leaders had to
cope with Iranian subversion and agitation in the years immediately
following the declaration of the Islamic Republic there, and the Turks
have no desire to repeat the experience with a militant Islamic Iraq.
In addition to Turkey, another secular regime, that of Syria, would
face a number of challenges resulting from an Iraqi civil war. The
circumstances of the Syrian dictatorship are, however, immeasurably
different from those of democratic Turkey. Syria is a Ba’athist police
state where unrest is quickly and brutally suppressed. Paradoxically, the
authoritarianism of the Syrian regime masks certain regime fragilities,
and it is uncertain that Syria would be immune to unrest and civil
disorder in Iraq.83 Additionally, a successful pro-American Iraq would
present serious problems for Damascus on a number of levels. Syria, in
this instance, would be almost totally encircled by pro-American nations
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and regimes. It would also face an unwelcome example of post-Ba’athist
political development in a neighboring country. Moreover, some Syrian
leaders seem to view U.S. hostility as based upon the very existence of a
Ba’athist Syria. In their minds, this means that Syrian cooperation with
the United States on issues such as terrorism will not ultimately prevent
the United States from seeking regime change in Damascus.84
Despite numerous problems associated with Iraqi unrest, Damascus
may see some beneﬁts in such an eventuality. In particular, the Syrian
leadership seems to feel that it has had every reason to believe that it
will be a future target of U.S. pressure, and perhaps even military
action, if democracy and stability were brought to Iraq.85 Moreover, the
proximity of a large U.S. military force to the Syrian border is of serious
concern to the leadership of the Assad regime.86 If the U.S. enterprise
in Iraq ends in failure or if U.S. troops are bogged down in an effort
to contain an Iraqi civil war, the perceived U.S. appetite for further
intervention may well disappear. Indeed, some U.S. accusations that
Syria is “facilitating” or at least allowing the ﬂow of foreign ﬁghters
into Iraq appear to be based on the premise that Syria views the current
insurgency in Iraq as its ﬁrst line of defense.87 Such statements may
underestimate the serious concerns that Damascus maintains about
provoking a U.S. attack, and are probably designed to prod Syria into
additional border security measures.
Nevertheless, Damascus also has good reasons to fear an Iraqi civil
war. It is uncertain how an Iraqi civil war might inﬂuence or inﬂame
ethnic and sectarian divisions within Syria. The key leadership in Syria
is composed of the Alawite sect of Islam, which comprises about 10-12
percent of the population. About 74 percent of the population is Sunni
Muslim (including both Arabs and ethnic Kurds), with the remainder of
the population being Druzes, Kurds, and other smaller groups.88 Sunni
Arabs probably constitute about 63 percent of the population.89 Many
traditionally-minded Sunnis view Alawites as heretics and deviationists
from the true path of Islam, as well as their social inferiors.90 The Alawites,
however, maintain that their religion is a branch of Shi’ite Islam. This
claim has been supported by two towering ﬁgures of Shi’ite history,
Lebanon’s Imam Musa Sadr and Iran’s Imam Ruhollah Khomeini,
although their declarations are somewhat tainted as they were made at
times when each leader was seeking Syrian support.91 Syria’s Alawite
leaders hoped such declarations might reduce tensions with the Sunnis,
although the ultimate guarantor of the regime was always the Army
and security forces.
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Syria is probably concerned about the rise of Islamic extremism in
an Iraqi civil war and will be especially concerned about Sunni Islamic
extremism, which became a serious and perhaps regime-threatening
problem for the Syrians in the early and mid-1980s.92 The potential
for Iraqi unrest to spread to Syria is uncertain, but Syrian citizens will
think carefully before provoking their government, which is willing to
employ a great deal of force to ensure its survival. Nevertheless, Syria
is already reported to be experiencing an upturn in religious devotion
in conservative neighborhoods within the cities and small Sunni Arab
towns for a variety of reasons, including the disappointment associated
with President Bashar Assad’s stillborn reform and liberalization
movement.93 Increased religious devotion and anti-regime Islamic
activism are two distinct phenomenons, but this trend is still unlikely
to reassure the government. Syria’s long border with Iraq provides
many opportunities for Islamic rebels in both countries to coordinate,
even if they see only temporary or tactical value in doing so, and Syria
has a continuing concern over the potential rise of a regime-threatening
Islamic opposition in Syria. U.S. insistence that Syria improve its border
security appears to have led to some improvements, but complete
control of the border is beyond the reach of the regime.
There are also between one and two million Kurds in Syria, although
exact estimates vary widely.94 Kurds in urban areas seem to have
assimilated much more fully into Syrian society, and some of the lower
estimates may not count all of them as Kurds. Other Kurds, particularly
from the rural areas, maintain a highly-distinct Kurdish identity and
are not fully integrated into Syrian society. Some Kurds from northeast
Syria refused to register in the 1962 census to avoid military conscription
and were thus denied citizenship. Others were denied citizenship on
various other pretexts, including an inability to prove that they or
their parents had lived in Syria since 1945.95 These policies prevented
these Kurds and their descendents from obtaining Syrian nationality,
furthering their status as outsiders. Between 200,000 and 360,000 Syrian
Kurds currently do not have Syrian citizenship.96 Not surprisingly, one
of the ﬁrst post-Saddam challenges to Damascus came from Syrian
Kurds. During a March 12 soccer match, a brawl erupted between fans
of teams supported by Arabs and Kurds.97 In the aftermath of the riots,
more clashes took place, and statues of the late President Hafez Assad
(the current President’s father) were defaced in Syria’s Kurdish areas.98
The Syrians reacted to these actions with characteristic harshness.
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Additionally, the leaders of various “unofﬁcial” Kurdish political
parties were told by senior intelligence ofﬁcials that the state would no
longer tolerate their activities, and they must disband.99 Kurdish parties
unanimously rejected this demand.100 The potential for Syrian Kurdish
unrest is therefore serious and may increase, should Kurdish-Arab
military strife break out in Iraq.
A civil war in Iraq will also have important implications for Lebanon.
In the event of an Iraqi civil war, Lebanese Muslims, and especially the
numerically dominant Shi’ites, can be expected to be concerned with
the fate of Iraq’s Shi’ite community, and a few young Shi’ite men may
further choose to go to Iraq.101 Leaders of the Lebanese Shi’ite militant
group, Hizballah, have made numerous statements about Iraq, and will
probably seek to support like-minded Shi’ite radicals in Iraq, should
civil war break out. Some Israeli sources have even gone so far as to
suggest that Hizballah seeks foreign adventures as a way of keeping
their militant identity and avoiding being turned into just another
Lebanese political party.102 While this viewpoint is probably excessive,
Hizballah will be reluctant to simply ignore a civil war in Iraq in which
its co-religionists are threatened and Shi’ite shrines are bombed.103 A
circulation of ﬁghters could occur between Iraq and Lebanon under
conditions of protracted sectarian ﬁghting.
Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinians.
The Egyptian government of President Husni Mubarak strongly
opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and issued a number of warnings
about negative consequences for U.S. interests in the Arab World if
the invasion proceeded. In the aftermath of the invasion, the Egyptian
government periodically has distanced itself from the United States to
avoid becoming the subject of domestic popular anger. Mubarak has
also attempted to present himself as a seasoned leader who warned
the U.S. administration against the invasion of Iraq but was ignored by
the U.S. leadership.104 Yet, beyond polishing his own image with the
Egyptian masses, it is not certain that Mubarak or the remainder of the
Egyptian leadership believes that they have large stake in the future of
Iraq. Currently, Egyptian government leaders are more likely to express
anger toward U.S. policy on Israeli/Palestinian issues rather than Iraq.
Most Egyptians have never felt a special relationship with Iraq. Iraqi
claims to Arab leadership have surfaced periodically since the 1950s
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and are especially poorly received by the majority of Egyptians who
see their country as the natural leader of the Arab World. Competition
between Iraq and Egypt for Arab leadership was particularly bitter at
various points during the Presidency of Gamal Abdul Nasser in Egypt
(1952-70). Nasser had an intense rivalry with the Iraqi monarchy, which
developed into an even more sour and angry “cold war” with the
successor Iraqi government of Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassim (195863).105 Later, under the Ba’ath party, Iraq led the effort to isolate Egypt’s
Sadat government after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979.106
Iraqi-Egyptian relations nevertheless improved dramatically within a
year because of Baghdad’s scramble for support during the Iran-Iraq
War.
Saddam’s claims of Arab leadership were sometimes off-putting
to Egyptians throughout his years in power, although there was also
sympathy for his Arab nationalism and struggle against the Iranians.
Additionally, the barbarity of Saddam’s regime disgusted a number of
Egyptians, but Ba’athist cruelty was not always viewed as atypical for
Iraq. Compounding problems, Egyptian workers who traveled to Iraq
in the 1980s to perform labor while Iraqi men were at the front with Iran
were often treated quite poorly. Egyptian public opinion during this
period was infuriated by stories of the abuse and murder of Egyptians
at Iraqi hands. Later, in 1990, Egypt supported Kuwait and joined the
multinational coalition against Iraq during the ﬁrst Gulf War. The
Cairo leadership did this after Saddam lied to President Mubarak in
July 1990, privately promising not to invade Kuwait.107 Saddam asked
Mubarak to reassure U.S. President George H. W. Bush that the crisis
over Kuwait could be expected to end soon. Saddam’s manipulation of
the Egyptian president publicly embarrassed Mubarak when it became
clear that Saddam was using him as a pawn in the overall strategy for
seizing Kuwait.108 Egypt also reaped considerable economic gains by
joining the coalition since the United States and Gulf Arabs forgave a
vast amount of Egyptian debt.
Current problems in Iraq probably do not have the same emotional
impact for Cairo as other key issues, since Egypt is not faced with
sectarian differences that might be aggravated by an Iraqi civil war.
The Egyptians, however, do have to cope with periodic problems from
violent Islamic dissidents, the most recent of which appear to have
been mostly defeated in the late 1990s. It remains unclear if this defeat
of the radical Islamists will remain a lasting victory for the Egyptian
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government. Critics point out that Egyptian security forces destroyed
radical terrorist organizations primarily by using repression, whereas
the root causes and misery leading to extremist appeal remain in
place.109 This situation suggests that extremist solutions may again ﬁnd
a popular following.
Egyptian radicals (including those associated with al-Qa’ida)
previously have made good use of international ties to other terrorists,
and they may be able to coordinate with Iraqi-based terrorists should
civil war conditions develop in that country. Such coordination would
be a problem for Egypt, but it should probably be manageable. While
the Egyptian government could face new radical challenges, such
developments will probably have only a limited relationship to what
happens in Iraq. The more dangerous problem will be if there is a
general upsurge in radical Egyptian terrorist activity at some point
where the government is particularly vulnerable. President Mubarak’s
refusal to appoint a Vice President, and his general unwillingness to
prepare the country for his death or departure from power, suggests
that such a period of vulnerability may occur in the foreseeable future
as the result of a succession crisis. Mubarak is 76 years old and seems
to favor his unpopular 41-year-old son, Gamal, to be the next president.
Gamal Mubarak would nevertheless ﬁnd it excruciatingly painful to
consolidate power after taking ofﬁce due to a lack of clear support from
any other source than his father.110
Jordan has an even stronger stake than Egypt in a stable, united,
and prosperous Iraq, and to the extent it can, is supporting U.S. efforts
to achieve that goal. Both before and after Saddam’s ouster from power,
Iraq was Jordan’s most important export market.111 Should Iraq
devolve into civil war, such economic relations would be difﬁcult, if
not impossible, and the Jordanian economy will suffer accordingly.
Additionally, Jordan, as a small country of limited resources, is
particularly vulnerable to any refugee crisis, which would almost
certainly follow an Iraqi civil war.
The Jordanian government traditionally has governed by balancing
alternative interests and perspectives, including those of conservative
tribal members, Palestinian nationalists, and those Islamists who are
willing to work within the political system. Mainstream Islamists who
oppose terrorism are an important force in Jordan, and organizations
such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its political arm, the Islamic Action
Front (IAF), have serious followings. In the event of an Iraqi civil war,
these groups undoubtedly will sympathize with Sunni Iraqi Islamists
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and will pressure the Jordanian government to be at least passively
supportive of the actions of these types of individuals. The prestige
of the Islamic organizations would also rise due to their vociferous
opposition to U.S. policy, which they would blame for any civil war.
Mainstream Islamists could become a much more serious domestic
center of political power and could perhaps constrain the ability of the
monarchy to conduct the pro-Western foreign policy with which it is
most comfortable.
There is also the issue of terrorism. Al-Qa’ida and its radical allies
have engaged in operations against Jordan just as they have against
Saudi Arabia, and a shadow war is believed to be occurring between the
radicals and the Jordanian intelligence services.112 This problem is likely
to intensify if Iraq enters into a civil war. A key leader of the current
Islamist insurgency in Iraq is Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi, a Jordanian
whose early forays into terrorism occurred in his own country in 1993,
where he sought to help overthrow the government. Zarqawi was
imprisoned in Jordan because of such actions but was later pardoned
as part of a far-ranging amnesty for Jordanian prisoners. His time
in prison did not make him any more sympathetic to the Jordanian
government, and, despite diversions to Afghanistan and elsewhere,
Zarqawi’s organization is suspected of the assassination of a U.S.
diplomat in Amman, Jordan, in October 2002.113 Moreover, Jordanian
authorities allege that Zarqawi was responsible for a 2004 plot to attack
Jordan’s General Intelligence Department, the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce,
and the U.S. Embassy in Amman with three trucks laden with 20 tons of
explosives and toxic chemicals. Jordanian sources maintain that such an
attack could have killed 80,000 people, although other sources consider
this claim to be highly exaggerated.114
According to Jordan’s King Abdullah, the situation in Iraq and
the Palestinian territories “feed off of one another.”115 This statement
reﬂects Amman’s concerns that the Jordanian government must
simultaneously deal with two of the most signiﬁcant regional concerns in
the contemporary Middle East in ways that could harm the monarchy’s
long-term political legitimacy, if progress is not made on these issues.
A highly destabilized Iraq thus could be a truly difﬁcult challenge for
the monarchy. Iraqi Islamists who may rise to prominence in a civil
war would probably view Jordan as a key target beyond Iraq for both
its strategic location and its cooperative relationship with the United
States.
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The Jordanian government, in addition to addressing its legitimate
concerns about Iraqi instability, is also seeking to appear active and
concerned over Iraq as a way of maintaining domestic support for the
government.116 To these ends, Amman has attempted to mediate with
the United States to reduce tensions with Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. These
measures include urging the United States to reach out to Sunni leaders
and to ease the de-Ba’athiﬁcation process.117 King Abdullah has also
stated that the United States may be insufﬁciently concerned about
Iranian domination of Iraqi Shi’ites’ leading to an Islamic government
in Iraq.118 Nevertheless, the Jordanians may have much less to fear from
a Shi’ite-dominated government than do other Sunni Arab leaders.
King Abdullah is a Sunni Muslim, but he is also as a member of the
Hashemite family, and, as such, claims direct family descent from the
Prophet Mohammed. This lineage has salience to a variety of Muslims,
and it is well-received by many Shi’ites worldwide. The original break
between Shi’ites and Sunnis occurred because of the Shi’ite belief that
members of the Prophet’s family are the most legitimate leaders of the
Muslim community. While contemporary Shi’ites do not seek their
leadership from the family of the Prophet, many do have considerable
respect for the Hashemites. King Hussein’s widow, Queen Noor, for
example, has commented on what she perceives as Shi’ite esteem for
the Hashemite family.119
Israel is, of course, a special case in the Middle East, and Israelis,
not surprisingly, had radically different views from the rest of Middle
Easterners about the opportunities presented by the U.S. invasion of
Iraq. Most Israeli leaders, as well as the Israeli public, strongly favored
a U.S. invasion of Iraq because of Saddam Hussein’s suspected strategic
weapons programs and his perceived willingness to use such systems
against Israel.120 Additionally, Saddam provided extensive ﬁnancial
support to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers killed in operations
against Israeli civilians. While the Iraqis attempted to present such
actions as a humanitarian effort to support the dependents of martyred
ﬁghters, the Israelis considered Iraqi actions as an incitement to the
Palestinians to commit murders that they might not otherwise carry
out.121 On the eve of war, close to 80 percent of the Israel public favored
a U.S. invasion, despite the perceived possibility that it could trigger
a missile strike―perhaps even with chemical or biological weapons―
against Israelis cities.122
Those Israelis who held high hopes for improved relations with Iraq
have been overwhelmingly disappointed by the aftermath of Saddam’s
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removal from power. Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, some Israeli
commentators viewed various Iraqi exiles, including Ahmad Chalabi
of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), as potentially friendly to Israel.
They made this assessment due to Chalabi’s ties with pro-Israeli ﬁgures
in Washington.123 Former American-based exiles, however, did not
emerge as serious contenders for power in Iraq despite initial U.S.
ﬁnancial support for some of their groups and agendas.124 Additionally,
these people were not in a position to push for improved ties with
Israel, even if they wished to expend their political capital to do so
(which is doubtful). The new Iraqi government even brieﬂy indicted
one Chalabi supporter under a 1969 Ba’ath party law for contacts with
Israel, although the charges were quickly dropped.125 Additionally, the
INC even chose to expel the individual involved in this action, perhaps
underscoring the unrealistic nature of hopes for strongly improved
Iraqi-Israeli relations.
Whatever future path Iraq takes, it now seems doubtful that any
major leader will seek strong political or economic ties with the Israelis.
Iraqi interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi already has strongly defended
his government against charges of undue Israeli inﬂuence, and he and
other government leaders have promised not to normalize relations
with Israel before other Arab nations do so as a part of an overall
Middle Eastern settlement.126 Any discussions of serious economic ties
between Israel and Iraq also seem increasingly farfetched.127 Moreover,
even in the absence of Iraqi-Israeli ties, Muqtada al Sadr and other Iraqi
radicals have voiced their suspicions about potential future government
dealings with the “Israeli terrorist enemy.”128 Islamic leaders and radical
Arab nationalists within Iraq are clearly positioned to cry betrayal at
the slightest movement in Israel’s direction.
An Iraqi civil war would present Israel with a mixed but mostly
worrisome strategic result. One of Israel’s greatest fears has been a
strong, united, anti-Israeli Iraq, with a vibriant economy and strong
military power, including weapons of mass destruction. Such an entity
may eventually emerge from a united and nationalistic post-sanctions
Iraq, but is unlikely to emerge from an Iraqi entity at war with itself.
Thus, one aspect of the strategic threat to Israel would be diminished
under these conditions. Nevertheless, other key problems remain.129 A
weak and divided Iraq would allow the development and strengthening
of Islamist and other anti-Israeli terrorist organizations that support
the training and ﬁnancing of radical anti-Israeli groups within Iraqi
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borders.130 Should a highly energized Islamist regime emerge from the
chaos of civil war, Israel would face a new enemy that may become
much more threatening than Saddam ever was in his last years in
power. Moreover, if Iraqi-based terrorists were able to help overthrow
the Jordanian government (which is moderate and maintains diplomatic
relations with Israel) this could mean a militant Islamist regime on
Israel’s longest border. This scenario is horrifying for the Israelis.
Currently, Israel is widely reported to maintain strong political and
military links with Iraqi Kurds. These links are not new and date back
to at least 1973.131 Israeli leaders at that time sought to destabilize the
Ba’athist regime, which they viewed as part of an “Eastern Front” that
could bolster the military threat against them. The Israelis have also
been accused of providing military training and aid to the Iraq Kurds in
the post-Saddam era, but they strenuously deny these claims.132 Should
intercommunal civil war break out in Iraq, the natural inclination of
the Israeli leadership will be to ﬁnd ways to support moderate Kurds,
with whom they have a long-standing relationship. Israeli political
leaders may view the development of a powerful Kurdish state as an
improvement in their geopolitical standing, although clear and decisive
support for such a goal would seriously endanger the alliance with
Turkey. The Turks tolerated Israeli efforts to support Iraq’s Kurds
when they sought to destabilize Saddam Hussein’s regime, but see
little justiﬁcation for Israeli support for the Iraqi Kurds under current
circumstances.133
The Palestinian reaction to an Iraqi civil war will vary according to
the circumstances of such a war. Should Islamists continue to rise to
leadership in the Iraqi insurgent movement, it is likely they will seek
to expand and consolidate their ties to Palestinian Islamic radicals.
Nevertheless, many Palestinians, including Islamists such as the
members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, are deeply troubled about the
danger of having the Palestinian cause lost inside a larger anti-Western
struggle and delegitimized with the West should it become identiﬁed
with al-Qa’ida and its supporters.134 The Hamas leadership, for example,
is known to be concerned about the possibility that it will be identiﬁed
with al-Qa’ida and correspondingly considered as terrorists who must
be eradicated as part of the U.S. Global War on Terrorism. Two leading
experts on Palestinian Islamist movements note that, on at least one
occasion, Hamas and Islamic Jihad agreed to a unilateral ceaseﬁre
against Israel to reduce the chances that they would be viewed as allies
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of al-Qa’ida and that the Palestinian cause would be “subsumed as
simply another front in the wider conﬂict.” 135
Thus, a civil war in Iraq in which Islamists become important
will probably lead to increased ties between Iraqi and Palestinian
radicals, although these ties may not be as extensive as might initially
be suspected. Additionally, such ties will be controversial among
Palestinian Islamists and Palestinians in general. Palestinian “localists”
concerned primarily with their own problems with Israel will come
into conﬂict with Palestinian “regionalists” in attempting to determine
a response to the issues raised in an Iraqi civil war. While the localists
may be dominant now, it is uncertain they will remain so indeﬁnitely.
Al-Qa’ida leaders are interested in recruiting Palestinians to their cause,
and do have at least a limited following in Lebanese refugee camps,
such as Ayn al Hilwah near Sidon.136 Al-Qa’ida supporters from within
the Palestinian community could therefore ﬁnd themselves involved
with Iraqi Islamists. Nevertheless, the pressures to become involved
in an Iraq civil war will probably not be greater than those to become
involved in the current struggle between Iraqi insurgents and the United
States. Palestinian involvement in the current Iraqi ﬁghting appears to
be marginal.137
Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf States.
The conservative monarchal leadership of Saudi Arabia has a deep
stake in the future of Iraq. An Iraqi civil war could be cataclysmic for
the Saudis, although a strong, independent, and democratic Iraq is not a
preferred option either. The underlying goals of the Saudi government
have been to support conservative states in the region, limit the spread
and appeal of anti-Saudi Islamic radicalism, and maintain ties with
the United States in ways that do not provoke excessive domestic
and international criticism. These policies are seen as a key to regime
survival. If the Saudi leadership were to have its choice of governments
in Iraq, they would probably prefer to see Iraq led by a conservative
Sunni Arab strongman, or at least a respected Sunni Iraqi elder statesman such as Adnan Pachachi. Either of these developments seems
virtually impossible under current conditions.
A democratic and pro-Western Iraq poses a number of problems
for the Saudis. Democracy in the Gulf has been a long-standing worry
for Saudi Arabia, and an Iraqi example could lead to pressure on the
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House of Saud to democratize. The Saudis also suspect that the United
States might be seeking a client state in Iraq as a counterweight to the
U.S.-Saudi relationship. The Saudis are not likely to favor an Iraqi
democracy because of such problems, but an Iraqi civil war probably
remains the worst possible scenario for the future of Saudi Arabia, as
it would complicate an already severe security crisis that exists within
that country.
The potential weakness of the Saudi regime and its tough and
continuing struggle with al-Qa’ida terrorists, both in exile and within
its own borders, suggest that a civil war in Iraq would be catastrophic
for the current government. Since May 2003, “Al-Qa’ida on the Arabian
Peninsula” (QAP) has shown itself to be a resourceful adversary
within the Kingdom capable of challenging the Saudi regime’s ability
to provide security for its citizens and for foreign residents, although
at this time unable to threaten the existence of the regime itself. QAP
has made extensive use of bombings and kidnappings to wage war
against the House of Saud and its allies. The spring 2004 U.S. and
Western decisions to urge the evacuation of their citizens from Saudi
Arabia indicated that some governments believed the Saudis, at least
temporarily, had lost control of important elements of their internal
security situation.138 Moreover, the Saudis cannot easily afford to have
Western expatriates driven from the kingdom by terrorism threats, since
they are still needed to keep the oil industry operating. This situation is
already a problem for the Saudis, since terrorist attacks such as a May
1, 2004, shooting spree in Yanbu and various kidnappings/executions
are targeted speciﬁcally at Westerners.139
The possible decline in the Iraq situation is, therefore, a complicated
and dangerous challenge for the Saudis linked to their current security
problems. If a Shi’ite-dominated Iraqi government unleashed a
campaign of military conquest against Iraqi Sunnis, or if Shi’ite militias
gain the upper hand in a civil war, the Saudi Arabian government may
face some particularly painful choices in formulating its foreign policy
towards Iraq. Sunni-Shi’ite violence in Iraq under these circumstances
would have an intense inﬂuence on Saudi domestic opinion, and
public opinion would probably seek governmental action to reign
in Iraqi Shi’ites. A passive Saudi Arabian policy towards Iraq would
anger a variety of Sunni Wahhabi Saudi citizens who view Iraq’s Sunni
Muslims as their co-religionists, while considering Shi’ites as little better
than apostates.
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Yet, a Saudi policy of supporting, or even simply tolerating,
increasingly radicalized Sunni ﬁghters traveling to Iraq from Saudi
Arabia could bolster enemies who might later turn on the House of
Saud, should they achieve their goals in Iraq. In particular, Saudi men
choosing to ﬁght in Iraq or going there to disperse funds could then
return to Saudi Arabia with radical ideologies, military skills, and
terrorist contacts, paralleling the experience of Saudis in Afghanistan
but possibly on a much larger scale.140 The Saudi government is not
currently tolerating such activity and would become even more stern
about such activities, should civil war conditions occur in Iraq.141
Nevertheless, some radical Islamists within the Kingdom are deeply
concerned about remaining on the sidelines, even under current
conditions. Hinting at potential future problems, a group of 26 Saudi
Islamic scholars unafﬁliated with the Saudi government issued a
fatwa in November 2004, calling for jihad against U.S. forces in Iraq.142
Radical clerics, bypassing the government, may issue other such fatwas
in response to an Iraqi civil war, although such opinions may also be
widely ignored as going against the conscience of the individual. One
individual in Saudi Arabia has even sued the “group of 26” clerics,
claiming they corrupted the mind of his son and caused his death in
Iraq.143
The Saudis also fear an empowered Shi’ite majority in Iraq, which
could align with Iran against them and perhaps direct subversive
messages at Saudi Shi’ites in the oil rich eastern province of Saudi Arabia.
This province has been calm recently, although there were pro-Iranian
and anti-government demonstrations in December 1979. Additionally,
Shi’ites in Saudi Arabia continue to have important grievances against
the Riyadh government.144 This distrust is sometimes aggravated by
Saudi Arabian differences with the Shi’ite theocracy in Iran. At the
height of these differences in the 1980s, Saudi political attacks against
Iran and Shi’ite Muslims in general often seemed to blend into one set of
charges.145 Rival Saudi-Iranian efforts to shape the future of Iraq could
severely damage relations between the two countries. Additionally, a
post-civil war Shi’ite-dominated government in Iraq may believe that
it has a score to settle with the Saudis should the civil war itself be
characterized by clearcut Saudi support for Sunni elements.
Another aspect of the potential problem is that many of the foreign
radicals currently in Iraq have placed the destruction of the Saudi
regime as a high priority. Should these individuals ﬂourish in a civil
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war setting, the Saudis would face an even more serious subversion
threat. Should these elements prevail in an Iraqi civil war, they would
be ﬂushed with victory and fully prepared to press forward with an
anti-Saudi agenda. Should al-Qa’ida-oriented radical groups gain an
increased foothold in Iraq, they would be able to threaten Saudi Arabia
to an even greater extent.
Ironically, for the Saudis, the most favorable side effect of an Iraq
civil war would be to push the United States much closer towards
Riyadh than it has been for at least a decade. Should Iraq devolve into
chaos, the value of Saudi Arabian oil to both the United States and the
West in general would skyrocket. The prospect of both Iraq and Saudi
Arabia dissolving into a nightmare of civil war and radicalism would
galvanize the West to support the Saudi regime to the greatest extent
possible. Yet, a huge infusion of last-minute help may or may not be
enough save a Saudi regime engulfed by radicalism. The return of a
highly-visible U.S. presence could further complicate the relations of
the Saudi government with its citizens. Saudi views of the United States
have consistently declined in the last few years as the result of U.S.
policies toward Iraq, Israel and the Palestinians, and U.S. homeland
defense measures that directly impact Saudi travelers. A heavy-handed
U.S. presence in the middle of a crisis may help the Saudi government,
but it would certainly have negative consequences as well, including
the furthering of Saudi Arabia’s image as a U.S. client state.
Of the other Arab Gulf states, only the tiny island nation of Bahrain
has a Shi’ite majority (along with a Sunni monarchy), although
some Gulf Arab states have substantial Shi’ite minorities. Kuwait, in
particular, has concerns about the danger of a divisive civil war taking
place in Iraq due to Sunni-Shi’ite national unity issues. Shi’ites constitute
about 30 percent of the total Muslim population of Kuwait. In the years
immediately following the 1979 Iranian revolution, an energetic and
sometimes effective Shi’ite terrorist network arose and perpetrated
serious acts of violence.146 These strong Iranian-supported terrorist
networks no longer exist in Kuwait, although extremist Shi’ite groups
still distribute literature and audiotapes deemed subversive by the
government.147 Sunni Kuwaitis may therefore worry that an Iraqi civil
war will inﬂame Shi’ites in Kuwait, and that any pro-Sunni actions by
the Kuwaiti government will create pressures for some Shi’ite radicals
to return to terrorism.
Wahhabism also has a following in the smaller Gulf Arab states,
although its most puritanical aspects are not always recognizable
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to Western visitors in the same way they are in Saudi Arabia. The
Kuwaiti government is already worried about its young men ﬁghting
in Iraq, and fears a radicalization problem if this process expands, as it
probably would in a civil war.148 In this regard, Islamic Affairs Minister
Abdullah al Maatuk has announced the creation of teams of experts
and clerics who are to direct educational efforts to combat extremism.149
Kuwaiti police have also been reported to close down rings of religious
extremists recruiting ﬁghters to go to Iraq from Kuwait. The number of
Kuwaitis who have gone to Iraq to ﬁght is uncertain, but young Kuwaiti
men have clearly engaged in this type of activity in Afghanistan in the
past. Many of the other Gulf Arab states may also have concerns about
how a civil war in Iraq may inﬂuence their youth, although Kuwait’s
problem may be especially disconcerting due to its proximity to the
Iraqi border.
Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are more
insulated from Iraqi events than Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or Bahrain.
Qatar has not suffered any recent terrorist incidents, and has introduced
an ongoing program of reform.150 It also does not have a border with
Iraq, but it could feel any ripple effect of events in Saudi Arabia. Thus
Doha is somewhat inoculated from the immediate problems of an Iraqi
civil war, although it may face internal and external criticism for its
high levels of cooperation with the United States, should the United
States be widely blamed for Iraqi civil unrest (as is likely).151 Qatar is
likely to simply accept such criticism since the protection of the United
States may become particularly important following any development
of large-scale civil unrest in Iraq.
The UAE has been only marginally inﬂuenced by the events in Iraq
thus far, although, like Qatar, it could feel substantial impact from the
collapse of the Saudi system. The UAE’s long history of political and
economic stability will almost certainly continue even following the
November 2004 death of its founding statesman, the much-respected
Sheikh Zayid Bin Sultan.152 Due to its staggering wealth, the UAE has
found it useful to seek a strong relationship with the United States. The
UAE, and especially its constituent emirate of Dubai, has sought to
consolidate ties with the United States through strong and noticeable
ties with American business, and these associations would help that
country deal with stability problems following the outbreak of an Iraqi
civil war.153 Additionally, the UAE will undoubtedly help Iraq to the
extent possible with humanitarian aid, and will pay particularly close
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attention to the plight of Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, perhaps using diplomatic
and other efforts to aid them in a civil conﬂict.
Yemen and Oman have also been quite insulated from many events
in Iraq. The initial impact of an Iraqi civil war on these countries would
probably be minimal, although Yemen has had a problem with alQa’ida-supported terrorist activity on its soil, and a noticeable number
of its young men have joined radical movements both in Yemen and
overseas. A few Yemeni ﬁghters have already been captured in Iraq
ﬁghting the U.S.-led coalition, and it is possible that some, including
Yemeni Shi’ites (who are almost entirely a Shi’ite sub-branch, the
Zaidis), would also participate in an Iraqi civil war. Nevertheless, the
overall political and security situation in Yemen will probably not
change dramatically as the result of an Iraqi civil war. Yemen will have
a terrorist problem in the indeﬁnite future and will deal with it through
force, and bargaining with tribes that may protect the terrorists. The
impact on Oman will probably also be extremely limited.
The Issue of the International Oil Market.
Apart from the effect on speciﬁc regional countries, a civil war in Iraq
will also have important implications for the international oil market.
Prior to the war, the Iraqi oil industry was burdened by a large number
of problems including a deteriorating infrastructure, bad management,
international sanctions, and exceedingly corrupt business practices that
were designed to enrich Saddam and his family rather than improve
the country’s export capacity. Exports conducted under the UN Oil for
Food Program (OFF) or smuggled out of Iraq, often in collaboration
with the Iranians, usually occurred only after the payment of extensive
bribes to the Iraqi leadership.154 In the aftermath of Saddam’s ouster,
hope existed for a new, more efﬁcient Iraqi oil industry unburdened by
extensive corruption. Yet, under widespread civil war conditions, the
oil export situation would deteriorate from the Saddam era rather than
improve.155
The disorder resulting from a civil war will make it difﬁcult, if not
impossible, for the Iraqis to continue to export oil, should civil war
conditions prevail throughout the entire country (which they may not).
Moreover, even if some Iraqi factions retain control over portions of
the Iraqi oil infrastructure and can export oil, it will not be a simple
economic decision for nations interested in buying it from them. Rather,
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purchasing oil from any Iraqi faction will infuse that faction with funds,
which they would almost certainly use to improve their position within
the ongoing struggle against other Iraqi groups. A decision to buy oil
from one group may also endow that group with an increased amount
of international legitimacy and may be seen as bolstering their claims to
rightful authority. International deals with the Kurdish leadership, for
example, may be viewed as tacit endorsement of any future Kurdish
claims to independence.
Additionally, oil infrastructure in the hands of any one faction may
face constant sabotage efforts from other factions. Since sabotaging oil
infrastructure can be quite simple, it is likely that such sabotage would
emerge as a major problem should civil war conditions develop.156
Targets vulnerable to such strikes would include pumping stations,
reﬁneries, and especially pipelines. Some 250 guerrilla attacks against
pipelines have already occurred in Iraq since the removal of Saddam
Hussein.157 Such attacks may be easier and more frequent should a civil
war develop. Additionally, skilled Iraqi workers needed to keep the
industry performing may be threatened or killed. Foreign oil specialists
would ﬁnd Iraq an uninviting place to work under such conditions
and would not be able to keep the system functioning. Thus, Iraq,
with 10-11 percent of the world’s oil reserves, may be removed from
the international oil market, except for a small trickle resulting from
smuggling.158
The problem with Iraq may be intensiﬁed if further political
problems develop in Saudi Arabia or among the Arab Gulf states. The
Saudis, as noted, are currently under siege from a terrorist group that
seeks to both destabilize the country and to drive foreign workers from
Saudi Arabia. The strikes against foreign workers directly threaten the
productivity of the oil industry. Simultaneous disruption of Iraqi and
Saudi oil activity would therefore become a serious economic crisis, since
the two countries combined control around 35 percent of the world’s
known oil reserves. The economic welfare of the West consequently
depends on maintaining some level of political stability in at least one,
and preferably both, of these countries.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations.
As noted throughout this monograph, the author does not intend
to convey the impression that a civil war in Iraq is inevitable. The
Iraqis are deeply concerned about this danger, and this awareness
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may encourage them to ﬁnd ways to compromise and avoid this grim
scenario. Moreover, if the beginnings of civil war do occur in one part
of the country (for example, the city of Kirkuk), it may still be possible,
although difﬁcult, to contain and reverse the conﬂict before it spreads
throughout the entire country.
The avoidance of a civil war is primarily an Iraqi responsibility,
despite the problem that the United States will be blamed widely for such
a development if it does occur. The United States cannot prevent such
a conﬂict if Iraqis are determined to create the preconditions for such a
struggle, and then to follow through with a violent effort to deﬁne the
future political system of Iraq. It is therefore reasonable for the United
States both to take preventive actions to the extent possible and to
consider possible options in case the worst happens and this eventuality
becomes a reality. In this spirit, the following recommendations are
offered.
1. The United States needs to make helping Iraqis prevent an Iraqi
civil war its ﬁrst priority in dealing with that country despite
the limits on U.S. power noted above. Civil war is probably the
only consequence of the U.S. invasion of Iraq that could lead
the population into a situation that is worse than the one they
lived with under Saddam, while simultaneously threatening
U.S. interests to a greater extent than Saddam ever did. If a civil
war can be avoided for the time being by deemphasizing rapid
democratic development, then this sacriﬁce will need to be made.
Some of Iraq’s sectarian differences may not be solvable through
democratic means unless a yet uncertain spirit of compromise
becomes more apparent in intercommunal relations in Iraq.
2. The United States must make it clear to Iraqi community
leaders that it is their responsibility to reach compromise with
responsible leaders of other ethnic or sectarian communities
because the United States cannot remain in Iraq indeﬁnitely,
nor can it adjudicate Iraqi factional disputes indeﬁnitely. In
this regard, U.S. troop presence cannot be allowed to become
a crutch for intransigent Iraqi leaders to refuse to explore the
possibility of compromise, knowing that civil war probably
will be prevented by the U.S. presence. Additionally, if the
Iraqi government reaches out to some of the insurgents through
amnesties and concessions, this may be part of the price to bring
important factions back into the political system.
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3. The United States must begin serious multilateral planning
and regional discussions for coping with a civil war. A civil
war in Iraq will not simply be a U.S. problem. The United States
should maintain and expand its relations with moderate Arab
states that fear an Iraqi civil war just as U.S. policymakers do.
If radicalism takes a foothold in Iraq, the United States will
need allies to contain and reverse the consequences of radical
empowerment. This means working with moderate Arab states,
including Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council
States. The United States will need all the help it is able to obtain
to contain and to reverse a civil war should this occur.
4. Should Iraq explode into civil war after U.S. withdrawal,
the United States must seek to avoid large-scale military
reintervention with ground forces and must instead, if possible,
support a regional or international force that would help to
stabilize Iraq. A renewed U.S. presence in many circumstances
will probably only inﬂame differences among the warring
factions, while further alienating elite and public opinion in at
least some allied and especially Arab countries.
5. The United States must make strong efforts to work with Saudi
Arabia and the other Gulf Arab states in waging the war on
terror. Saudi Arabia has been the subject of public U.S. hostility
and anger since the 9/11 attacks, although the U.S. Government
has not allowed such anger to be translated into seriously
counterproductive policies. While reform in Saudi Arabia will
remain the ultimate bulwark against radicalism, the violent
overthrow of the regime by Islamic radicals will become an even
more serious short-term threat should its northern neighbor
devolve into civil war. Should Iraq and Saudi Arabia be plunged
into turmoil simultaneously, the economic consequences for the
West would be catastrophic.
6. The United States needs to discourage Iraqi Kurds from
declaring an independent state, and it must dissuade Iraqi
Kurds from supporting activities in neighboring states that
could provoke foreign military intervention. This will not
be easy as the Kurds do have a strong moral case for selfdetermination. Nevertheless, the Kurds will only be able to
achieve self-determination by engulﬁng the region in blood,
probably including a great deal of Kurdish blood. Rather, the
40

United States must support respect for Kurdish human rights
and community rights within their respective nations.
7. The United States may need to consider opening a dialogue
with Iran on Iraq-related matters. Iran and the United States
have widely divergent interests in Iraq, but they may at times
be able to ﬁnd common ground on important issues. Temporary
and tactical cooperation with Iran may be permissible so long as
the fundamental differences between the United States and Iran
on long-term goals are always kept ﬁrmly in mind.
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